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Resurgence of diphtheria in Europe 
For several years, diphtheria was nearly forgotten in 
most European countries, as it had been eliminated 
following the implementation of the generalized 
vaccination of children. In this encouraging context the 
recent occurrence of a massive epidemic in the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union 
was unexpected. How will that epidemic, which is 
actually not yet controlled, develop. Is it threatening for 
other European countries? Can these countries be 
considered to be sufficiently protected against a return 
of diphtheria? Such are the questions raised today about 
the immediate future of diphtheria in Europe. 
Over the last half-century, diphtheria dramatically 
declined in Europe. In the past, until World War 11, 
during which an upsurge of morbidity was observed, 
this severe respiratory disease due to toxigenic Cory- 
ncharrcvium diphtlicriae organisms was endemic in iiiost 
countries, including European ones, affecting rnainly 
children, particularly those of pre-school age [I]. At 
least 5% of people suffered on any given day from 
clinical diphtheria; among them, 5 to 10% died, while 
the rest of the population was naturally immunized by 
asymptomatic infection. The generalized vaccination of 
young children with diphtheria toxoid was imnple- 
mented in industrialized countries in the late 1940s and 
during the 1950s. Subsequently, endemic diphtheria 
progressively declined, and even disappeared during the 
1970s and 1980s, in most European countries, as in 
other well-vaccinated industrialized countries. How- 
ever, limited outbreaks occurred as happened in 
Sweden in 1984-86. While the circulation of toxi- 
genic strains of C. diplzflzeriae seemed to be eliminated 
by the antitoxin vaccination, non-toxigenic strains were 
still circulating, causing sporadic cases of septicemia, 
endocarditis and arthritis, mainly in adults living in very 
poor socio-economic conditions [2]. Moreover, a 
dramatic change in the antitoxin immunity of the 
general population appeared, according to several sero- 
surveys carried out in different industrialized countries. 
These surveys showed in adults a partial and progressive 
waning of the immune protection according to age, 
which could be explained by the absence of recon- 
mended vaccine boosters, and the lack of natural 
contacts with toxigenic C. diphtheriae, resulting in an 
increasing susceptibility of the adult population [1,3,4]. 
Women were generally found to be even more 
susceptible than men, who were probably reimniunized 
by compulsory vaccination during military service. So, 
while most children were fully protected, provided that 
the majority of them were properly vaccinated, about 
50% of the European adult populLition was not, and is 
presently partially or totally susceptible to diphtheria. 
In the Soviet Union, endemic diphtheria drarna- 
tically decreased following the general vaccination of 
children, but did not totally disappear, and was 
controlled a t  a low level in the 1970s [S]. Then its 
incidence, which began to slightly increase in the 
1980s, sharply rose after 1990, reaching 19,462 cases 
in 1993, and culminating in 1994 and 1995 with, 
respectively, 47,808 and 50,412 cases. Case-fatality rates 
ranged from 2-3% (Russia, Ukraine) to more than 20'% 
(Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan). Starting in Russia, 
mainly in Moscow and St Petersburg (where the attack 
rate exceeded 50 per 100,000 in 1993), the epidemic 
then spread to other states and to the Ukraine, Belarus 
and the Baltic Republics, Moldavia, the Caucasus and 
the Asiatic NIS. In 1995 the epidemic seemed to be 
stabilized in the European part of Russia, following the 
implementation of a strengthened control program, 
including vaccination, but was still increasing in the 
Ukraine and in some Asiatic Republics. This epidemic 
was first characterized by a shift in the age distribution 
of cases from children to adults: 6O'%, to 80% of Russian 
or Ukrainian patients were >15 years old. O n  the other 
hand, children remain most affected in the Asiatic 
Republics. The biotype gravis was predominant. 
Several ribotypes were identified, but ribotypes 1 and 
2 were more frequent in the European part of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The massive resurgence of diphtheria in that part 
of the world could be explained by [5,6]: 
(a) A dramatic decrease of vaccine coverage in 
young children, which fell to around 50% or less in 
some urban areas of Russia and in the Ukraine; this fdl 
was attributed to a loss ofconfidence in vaccines, which 
suffered from some negative propaganda in the media, 
to an excessive list of contraindications, and further- 
more to irregular supplies of vaccine. 
(b) Gap in immunity among adults, due to the lack 
of boosters in school-age children and in adults. This 
was already known, from serosurveys carried out in 
Russia prior to the epidemic, showing a very low 
protection rate in adults (lower than 40% in individuals 
above 15 years of age in Moscow, 1984). 
(c) The disorganization of health services associa- 
ted with the political upheaval, resulting in a shortage 
of resources for diagnosis and management of cases, 
prevention of secondary cases in contacts, and for 
control of the spread of the epidemic by vaccination. 
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(d) Large movements of the civil population, 
facilitating the spread of infection throughout the NIS, 
as well as the high morbidity and mobility of military 
personnel. 
The emergence of some new virulent strains 
cannot be excluded. O n  the other hand, the vaccine 
potency was not implicated, as three doses have in- 
duced 82% of protective efficacy in Gev, and 96% in 
Moscow. 
Several cases were imported from the NIS into 
some neighboring European countries (Finland, 
Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, Norway) by visitors or 
returning travelers. Two cases were observed in US 
citizens staying in or visiting Russia and the Ukraine. 
In Turkey the incidence rate markedly increased in 
1993-94, and then fell to nearly zero. 
What about the risk of reintroducing diphtheria 
into well-vaccinated European populations? Regarding 
the growing circulation of people between eastern and 
western European countries, the importation, from the 
NIS as well as from any endemo-epidemic country in 
the world, of toxigenic strains of C. dipktheviae by a 
traveler or a visitor (either an asymptomatic carrier or 
a not-recognized patient) is possible - and has already 
occurred. However, in a population among which 
adults are now partially susceptible, what is the risk of 
occurrence of secondary cases and even of a local 
outbreak? Furthermore, what is the risk of reintro- 
duction of diphtheria and of its epidemic spread? Until 
now, no secondary cases have been observed around the 
few imported cases in European countries. Another 
reassuring argument is that the health structures and 
resources of these countries are capable of rapidly 
controlling a threat of outbreak, in groups at risk or in 
the general population. 
In any case, European countries which formerly 
succeeded in eliminating diphtheria should draw 
lessons from and take advantage of the present alert, in 
improving their protection against the risk of reintro- 
duction of respiratory diphtheria and strengthening 
control measures such as the following [6,7]: 
(a) Surveillance, clinical and biological. If we 
consider that most practicing physicians and biologists 
have never seen a single case of clinical diphtheria 
and have never isolated the C. diplztheviue organism, 
education of the health profession seems to be neces- 
sary. The investigation and laboratory examination of 
sore throats, particularly membranous pharyngitis, 
should be developed again. In addition, all isolated 
strains of C. diphtkeriae should be sent to a reference 
laboratory, national or regional, for evaluation of 
toxin production, and typing. Molecular typing, like 
ribotyping or pulse gel electrophoresis, is essential to 
identify the provenance of the strains and to follow 
their movements throughout the countries [4,6]. 
(b) To restore and maintain the immune protection 
of the adult population. In countries at higher risk, 
mass vaccination compaigns, particularly targeted on 
the adult population, could be considered, as carried 
out in Finland in 1993-94. In all countries routine 
immunization programs should be reinforced in adults. 
In order to attenuate the risk of clinical reaction after 
revaccination, a low dose of highly purified diphtheria 
toxoid should be used, combined with a full dose of 
tetanus toxoid (Td). Diphtheria vaccination or booster 
is already advised for travelers going to endemo- 
epidemic countries, and could be recommended to 
some occupational groups at risk, includmg healthcare 
workers, teachers, and personnel working in contact 
with young children. A decennial booster of Td  could 
be recommended for the general population, following 
the example of the USA; however, as the feasibility of 
this recommendation is questionable, it has been 
suggested to replace the use of monovalent tetanus 
toxoid by the general use of Td, whenever Td is 
indicated, e.g. for tetanus prevention in the wounded. 
However, the priority is obviously to rapidly end 
the current epidemic. It is not only a concern of the 
NIS, but also a regional, if not a global, concern. For 
their own safety, European countries are interested in 
helping the NIS to better control such epidemics. The 
WHO Regional Office for Europe (Copenhagen) 
played an important part [6] in coordinating the inter- 
national cooperation and planning control activities, 
such as: (a) the large-scale vaccination of all the 
population at risk, possibly by mass campaigns; (b) the 
proper management of diphtheria cases, including their 
prompt recognition and confirmation by laboratory 
examination, and their prompt treatment by antibiotics 
and serum; (c) the identification, chemoprophylaxis 
and surveillance of close contacts; and (d) the re- 
inforcement of epidemiologic surveillance. 
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